TPI Global Climate Transition Centre
Research and Data at LSE

Global School of Sustainability

# ASCOR framework v. 2.0: consultation report

December 2025

ASCOR

## The TPI Global Climate Transition Centre at LSE

The TPI Global Climate Transition Centre (TPI Centre) is an independent, authoritative source of research and data on the progress of corporate and sovereign entities in transitioning to a low-carbon economy. It is part of the Global School of Sustainability at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). The TPI Centre is the academic partner of the Transition Pathway Initiative (TPI), a global initiative led by asset owners and supported by asset managers, aimed at helping investors and other stakeholders assess company, bank and sovereign preparedness for the transition to a low-carbon economy and supporting efforts to address climate change. More than 155 investors globally, representing approximately US$87 trillion[1] combined Assets Under Management and Advice, have pledged support for TPI. The TPI Centre is also the academic research expert of Assessing Sovereign Climate-related Opportunities and Risks (ASCOR).

www.transitionpathwayinitiative.org/ascor

### ASCOR project partners

ASCOR is an investor-led initiative. It is co-chaired by Claudia Gollmeier at Colchester Global Investors, Esther Law at Amundi Asset Management and Adam Matthews at the Church of England Pensions Board. The ASCOR Investor Director is Claire Meier. The ASCOR Advisory Committee is composed of asset owners, asset managers and investor networks. Its members include Allspring Global Investments, Amundi Asset Management, the Asia Investor Group on Climate Change (AIGCC), Ceres, the Church of England Pensions Board, Colchester Global Investors, the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC), the Investor Group on Climate Change (IGCC), Insight Investment, MFS Investment Management, Ninety One and Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI).

www.ascor.org

### Report authors

This report was written by Setenay Hizliok, Nour Albrzawi, Camila Cristancho-Duarte, Simon Dietz, Sylvan Lutz, Giorgia Monsignori, Carmen Nuzzo and Antonina Scheer. All were staff at the TPI Centre at the time of writing. The views in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or their funders. The authors declare no conflict of interest in preparing this report.

### Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Claudia Gollmeier of Colchester Global Investors, Claire Meier, the ASCOR Investor Director, and Esther Law of Amundi Asset Management for their review of an earlier draft of this report. The authors would also like to thank Adrien Rose and Manickam Valliappan, who were staff at the TPI Centre at the time of writing, for their contributions to the development of this report.

The report was edited by Georgina Kyriacou.

This report was first published in December 2025 by the TPI Centre.



Suggested citation: Hizliok S, Albrzawi N, Cristancho-Duarte C, Dietz D, Lutz S, Monsignori G, Nuzzo C, Scheer A (2025) *ASCOR framework v. 2.0: consultation report*. London: TPI Global Climate Transition Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.

*Front cover photo by Wolfgang Weiser/Unsplash*

[1] This figure is subject to market-price and foreign-exchange fluctuations and, as the sum of self-reported data by TPI supporters, may double-count some assets.

# Contents

# 1. Introduction

**This document describes the purpose, background and content of an online consultation survey launched to seek stakeholders' feedback on potential changes to the Assessing Sovereign Climate-related Opportunities and Risks (ASCOR) framework. It is designed to assist respondents to complete the online survey.**

Increasing investor adoption and use of the ASCOR tool reflect the demand for transparent, consistent and decision-useful data to monitor sovereigns' climate performance. Many sovereign bondholders acknowledge the growing relevance of climate risks to sovereign creditworthiness and long-term fiscal resilience.[2] There is also recognition that, due to the size of the asset class and the importance of state actors in the climate transition, integrating sovereign bonds into net zero investment strategies is critical for investors to meet their individual net zero commitments.[3] Given the impact of regulatory environments on companies' operations, sovereign climate performance is also of interest to corporate investors.[4]

ASCOR helps investors, especially sovereign bondholders, to frame climate change considerations within investment decisions. The ASCOR in Practice report maps the ASCOR tool against the Net Zero Investment Framework (NZIF),[5] highlighting the areas of alignment between the two. Building on the NZIF guidance, many investors have begun to integrate ASCOR data into their internal analytical processes. The growing interest in the tool is evidenced by the recent launch of the first exchange-traded fund (ETF) to track an index constructed using ASCOR data.[6] Beyond index construction and investment products, the tool has also proven valuable to sovereign issuers. The NDC Partnership's Climate Toolbox features ASCOR among its key resources to support countries in developing, financing and achieving their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Notably, when Slovenia became the first European country to issue a sustainability-linked bond (SLB) in 2025, it explicitly cited the ASCOR assessment within its inaugural framework.[7]

## Background and purpose of the 2025–26 consultation and this report

In 2022, ASCOR's academic research expert, the TPI Global Climate Transition Centre (TPI Centre), developed an initial framework of indicators drawing on working group sessions with asset owners, asset managers and investor networks. These indicators went through a public consultation in 2023, leading the way to the development of the first version of the ASCOR framework (v. 1.0).

The ASCOR framework has undergone minor adjustments each year since then and has been used to assess a universe of countries that expanded from 25 to 70 in 2024, and to 85 in 2025 (see Figure 1.1). The TPI Centre updates the methodology annually based on findings during the assessment research process and feedback received from national governments. At the time of writing in late 2025, we are exploring whether the framework requires more substantial adjustments considering the current state of investor priorities, country practices, scientific evidence and data availability.

**This consultation report provides a description of proposed structural and methodological changes and identifies limitations to those changes. We invite investors, sovereigns and other stakeholders to complete the consultation survey online and comment on the proposed changes or propose their own. The consultation survey will remain open until 31 January 2026.**

We aim to ensure the framework remains relevant and decision-useful while preserving its integrity over time by introducing only the most essential updates. This maintains a frugal approach that concentrates on factors that can be meaningfully and consistently compared across sovereigns. The survey responses will be reviewed by the TPI Centre research team for their potential

[2] PRI (2023) Considering climate change in sovereign debt.
[3] IIGCC (2024) Sovereign Bonds and Country Pathways discussion paper.
[4] Nuzzo C and Scheer A (2025) Making national climate action investable: why and how?
[5] IIGCC (2024) Net Zero Investment Framework 2.0.
[6] FTSE Russell, ING and Robeco (2025) Rethinking Sovereign Debt to Finance the Climate Transition Introducing a novel investment solution.
[7] Republic of Slovenia (2025) Sustainability-linked Bond Framework.

integration into this first major update of the ASCOR framework (v. 2.0). Input from respondents to the consultation may be used to update the framework in 2026, conduct research in future years or pilot new methodologies which may first be published in beta form.

Figure 1.1. Evolution of the ASCOR framework


## Structure of the report

This report describes three main areas for consultation:

- How the ASCOR tool can continue to support evolving investor expectations – see Section 2.
- A potential restructuring for the framework to add a novel layer of sectoral depth to the analysis – see Section 3.
- Next steps – see Section 4.

# 2. Revisiting how ASCOR can continue to support investor objectives

**Since its launch, ASCOR has been adopted by investors and sovereigns for various use cases. However, the sovereign climate space is evolving and ASCOR strives to continue providing relevant data for investor decision-making. Understanding how investor priorities and the dialogue between investors and sovereigns have evolved is crucial to this process. This section outlines the current framework, design principles and assessment methodology as well as the online ASCOR tool where users can access the data. We present the corresponding questions that appear in the survey. Through this section and corresponding survey questions we also invite feedback on communications and potential new research topics.**

## The ASCOR framework

The ASCOR framework comprises three pillars, Emissions Pathways, Climate Policies and Climate Finance, divided into 14 thematic areas which contain binary performance indicators and quantitative metrics (see Table 2.1). Each pillar of the ASCOR framework evaluates a distinct component of sovereign action on climate change. Appendix 1 provides a detailed examination of potential methodological changes by area and seeks feedback for potential solutions.

Alignment with this framework requires a whole-of-government approach. The ASCOR framework is broadly comparable across years and results are published annually. Middle- and low-income countries are exempted from selected areas, indicators and metrics to reflect countries' common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities for climate action. Some exemptions are based on other country characteristics or groupings, e.g. the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Annex categories (see Appendix 2). The ASCOR framework methodology note provides further details on how each indicator and metric is assessed.

Table 2.1. Overview of the ASCOR framework

| Pillar 1. Emissions Pathways (EP) | Pillar 2. Climate Policies (CP) | Pillar 3. Climate Finance (CF) |
|---|---|---|
| EP 1. Emissions trends | CP 1. Climate legislation | CF 1. International climate finance |
| EP 2. 2030 targets | CP 2. Carbon pricing | CF 2. Transparency in climate costing |
| EP 3. 2035 targets | CP 3. Fossil fuels | CF 3. Transparency in climate spending |
| EP 4. Net zero targets | CP 4. Sectoral transitions | CF 4. Renewable energy opportunities |
| | CP 5. Adaptation | |
| | CP 6. Just transition | |

Note: All indicators and metrics included in the ASCOR framework are presented in Appendix 2.

**Seven principles have informed the design of the ASCOR framework.** Indicators should be:

1. Assessable using publicly available data
2. Accessible to investors, prioritising clearly interpretable binary questions
3. Evaluated using a transparent methodology
4. Chosen to avoid unnecessary additions to the reporting burden of sovereign entities
5. Analysed at the national level
6. Aligned with 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities'
7. Focused on evaluating how sovereigns are proactively managing climate risks and opportunities rather than on measuring risk exposure

**Consultation questions (appearing in the online survey)***

2.1. To what extent do you agree that the ASCOR framework supports investor objectives?
*Answers provided on a five-point scale from 'Strongly agree' to 'Strongly disagree'.*

2.2. For the criteria below, select the extent to which you think ASCOR meets investor objectives.
Criteria: Comparability; Transparency; Country coverage; Ease of use and interpretability
*Answers provided on a three-point scale from 'To a large extent' to 'Not at all'.*

2.3. Please provide any feedback on the current country exemptions provided in Appendix 2. For example, developed countries are exempted on transparency in climate costing (area CF 2).

2.4. To what extent do you think the existing indicators assess the most essential aspects of sovereign climate performance?
Answers *provided on a three-point scale from 'To a large extent' to 'Not at all'.*

2.5. Given the ASCOR framework's areas assessing country performance in managing climate-related opportunities and risks, are there any critical areas that are missing or data sources that we should consider? Please explain.

**All similar boxes in this report state the questions that appear in the online survey. We ask that the survey is completed online, rather than via responding to this report.*

## The ASCOR tool

The ASCOR tool is designed to provide a transparent and comparable snapshot of country performance. It enables users to download all data points, investigate overall country performance across the areas of the framework and compare countries' emissions pathways (see Figure 2.1). We are seeking feedback on additional features, navigation improvements or design changes that would help users access information more easily and use the data more effectively. This could include changes to what is shown on the country-specific pages or on the ASCOR tool landing page (e.g. additional summary information, or a 'peer comparison table' to evaluate results across selected countries shown side by side).

Figure 2.1. Comparing countries' emissions pathways



**Consultation questions**

2.6. To what extent do you agree that the current structure and functions of the ASCOR tool provide an informative user experience?
*Answers provided on a five-point scale from 'Strongly agree' to 'Strongly disagree'.*

2.7. What other functions would make the tool more intuitive and decision-useful?

2.8. How useful do you find the binary Yes/No approach for stating indicator results?
*Answers provided on a three-point scale from 'Very useful' to 'Not useful'.*

2.9. What other ways of communicating results would you find useful (e.g. paragraph summary of findings, total percentage of indicators in each area that are met by the country)?

## Communications

In addition to our annual data update on the ASCOR tool and adjustments to the methodology, we produce a range of materials and outreach activities to communicate our findings and make our work more accessible:

- The annual State of the Sovereign Transition report series synthesises the assessment results with in-depth thematic sections and discusses their implications for investors and sovereigns.
- Regular webinars present key findings from the assessment results and discuss these with investor and sovereign representatives.
- The annual ASCOR progress notes, which are usually published a few months before the annual data release, summarise project developments and announce next steps.
- The ASCOR in Practice report outlines use cases for both investors and sovereigns.
- The ASCOR explainer video series provides short videos explaining each area of the framework.
- Regular commentaries communicate our sovereign research to a broader audience.
- Outreach activities including regional roundtables have been held to raise awareness about the ASCOR tool, gaining insights for potential evolutions of the framework.

**Consultation questions**

2.10. How useful do you find the current level and types of communication?
*Answers provided on a three-point scale from 'Very useful' to 'Not useful'.*

2.11. Please share any other feedback on communication channels, materials or ways to improve the accessibility of the data and outputs.

## ASCOR pillar scores

The annual *State of the Sovereign Transition* series includes a synthesis of country results into 'pillar scores'.[8] This analysis aggregates the framework from around 80 indicators and metrics into two key aspects of countries' climate transitions:

- The *Emissions Pathways* pillar score reflects recent mitigation efforts and the ambition of future targets.
- The *Climate Policies and Finance* pillar score reflects the tools, systems and financial commitments intended to implement a country's mitigation and adaptation plans.

The pillar scores enable an analysis of whether country characteristics, such as income level or region, correlate with overall climate performance. They also express more succinctly how a given country performs relative to other countries. These aggregate scores are not included on the ASCOR tool, but the methodology and a table of country results by income group and by quartile is included in our annual reports (see Appendix 3).

[8] Scheer et al. (2024) State of Transition in Sovereigns 2024; Hizliok et al. (2025) State of the Sovereign Transition 2025.

**Consultation questions**

2.12. How useful do you find the pillar score analysis?
*Answers provided on a three-point scale from 'Very useful' to 'Not useful'.*

2.13. Please provide any feedback on the pillar score methodology and how this analysis is communicated.

## State-owned enterprises

The TPI Centre is considering additional research to deepen its analysis of sovereign transition risk. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) often play a significant role in a country's transition, presenting both risks and opportunities. As major corporate actors, SOEs often control emissions-intensive sectors such as energy, transport and heavy industry, giving governments a direct lever to decarbonise these systems. As sovereign entities, SOEs also serve as instruments of public policy, enabling states to align long-term investment, regulation and national climate commitments with implementation. As such, SOEs can impact a country's ability to achieve national climate commitments.[9]

Countries that host major SOEs have an opportunity to shape the decarbonisation of these entities and to encourage other companies to follow their example. A deeper understanding of how climate risks are managed within SOEs can also enhance investors' assessment of country-level risk. This is particularly relevant for SOEs in the oil and gas sector, given their economic importance and high exposure to transition risk. While SOEs can be assessed using existing corporate climate assessment tools (e.g. Pemex, Petrobras and Saudi Aramco are already assessed using the TPI Centre's corporate methodology), there may be added value in examining how an SOE's climate performance affects a sovereign's overall transition.[10] However, comparability across countries would be limited because some countries may not have any major SOEs, and those that do may have SOEs that operate in very different sectors. Climate disclosure from SOEs also tends to be weaker compared with publicly-traded companies, making assessments difficult. In addition, some countries may have other actors with more significant impacts on national transition, such as sub-sovereign governments as well as major publicly traded companies (see next section).

This is an exploratory research area that, responding to growing investor interest, could be developed as a complement to the TPI Centre's existing sovereign and corporate assessments, subject to funding.

**Consultation questions**

2.14. To what extent do you agree that additional analysis of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the ASCOR framework would add value to investors' understanding of sovereign risk?
*Answers provided on a five-point scale from 'Strongly agree' to 'Strongly disagree'.*

2.15. What aspects of SOE climate performance could best inform the ASCOR analysis?

## Assessing corporate climate action

The credibility of a country's transition depends on climate action implemented by a range of actors, including private sector companies in high-emitting sectors that operate within the country. Corporate climate action – through disclosure, target-setting and alignment with the Paris Agreement – provides insight into whether national policies such as mandatory climate reporting[11] and other incentives are translating into real-world change among companies. New metrics could bring this information into the ASCOR framework using data from the TPI Centre's

[9] OECD (2022) Climate change and low-carbon transition policies in state-owned enterprises.
[10] See "Use case: Analyse corporate investments" and Explainer Box 3 in Honneth et al. (2025) ASCOR in practice: use case and insights.
[11] See indicator CP4c in Scheer et al. (2025) ASCOR framework: methodology note v. 1.2.

corporate assessments. The TPI Centre's company universe comprises the highest emitting companies that are also the largest by market capitalisation.

Potential new quantitative metrics could be:

- What share of TPI Centre companies headquartered in the country have integrated climate change into their corporate strategy (i.e. meeting Management Quality Level 4)?
- What share of the TPI Centre companies headquartered in the country have targets aligned with 1.5°C by 2050?

A limitation for these metrics is that companies assessed by the TPI Centre are headquartered unevenly across ASCOR countries. In addition, given there are numerous multinational corporations, the location of headquarters is an imperfect proxy for assessing the landscape of corporate alignment in a country.

**Consultation questions**

2.16. To what extent do you agree that linking corporate and sovereign assessments would add value to the ASCOR framework?

*Answers provided on a five-point scale from 'Strongly agree' to 'Strongly disagree'.*

2.17. Given the limitations of company coverage and headquarters being an imperfect proxy, what feedback would you provide for potential corporate-related metrics?

# 3. Exploration of the framework structure

**Drawing on emerging literature and practical guidance on national and sectoral transition planning, this section revisits the current pillars to present a potential alternative structure for the ASCOR framework which integrates a novel sectoral layer to the assessment. As before, we provide the corresponding questions from the online survey.**

## National and sectoral transition planning

There is a growing focus on making Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement credible, investable and implementable.[12] The Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) highlights that while NDCs are useful tools for assessing countries' climate ambition, they often lack information on policy implementation to inform investment decision-making.[13]

Each country's path to net zero is shaped by its historical emissions, economy and sectoral makeup. The low-carbon transition creates opportunities and risks that surface differently across sectors and nations. Government plans to decarbonise specific high-emitting sectors can demonstrate that a country has a credible strategy to implement its NDC and can inform investors about unique national priorities and limitations. To provide decision-useful information for investors, countries should complement their NDCs with coordination mechanisms, sectoral decarbonisation roadmaps and clear financing strategies.[14]

Sectoral transition plans can help link national climate strategies with sub-national and corporate transition plans.[15] Robust sectoral pathways can assist market participants in aligning their activities with governments' climate goals and demonstrate the investment-readiness of the country itself. This process calls for a whole-of-government approach as well as budgetary planning. It also requires the involvement of relevant stakeholders in the planning process to identify investment opportunities and leverage transition finance.[16]

Long-term low-emissions development strategies (LT-LEDS) and national climate strategies such as National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) often serve as multi-sector strategies by setting decarbonisation targets and policies for major sectors. A few countries including Australia, Brazil, France, Japan and the UK have also initiated sectoral transition planning to outline how their economy-wide targets translate into sectoral ones and what policies and financial levers will be used to achieve those targets. However, cost estimates and planned investments are often limited across these practices.

**In light of the emerging investor interest in implementable NDCs, sector roadmaps and investment plans, we are seeking feedback on a potential restructuring of the ASCOR framework that would (i) reorganise the existing pillars to better communicate the fundamentals of national transition planning and (ii) integrate a sectoral scope into each of the pillars.**

## Revisiting the pillars: a new structure

The three pillars of the ASCOR framework assess the most important elements of national transition planning under specific themes: Emissions Pathways, Climate Policies and Climate Finance. We are revisiting these themes to evaluate whether they could better analyse and communicate overall country performance.

In Figure 3.1, we present a potential reorganisation of the current pillars. It splits the first pillar, Emissions Pathways, into two pillars, assessing *Performance* and *Ambition* separately. This would

[12] OECD/UNDP (2025) Investing in Climate for Growth and Development: The Case for Enhanced NDCs.
[13] IIGCC (2024) Making NDCs investable – the investor perspective.
[14] IIGCC (2025) Principles for developing sector decarbonization roadmaps; Nuzzo C and Scheer A (2025) Making national climate action investable: why and how?
[15] Transition Finance Council (2025) Sector Transition Plans: The Finance Playbook; Net Zero Council and Transition Finance Council (2025) Sector Transition Plan: Guidance. Version 1.0; Gilbey et al. (2025) Sector Transition Plans: A bridge between national ambition and company transition plans.
[16] Nassiry and Dixon (2025) Bridging the Gap: NDCs 3.0, National Transition Plans and Climate Investment Prospectuses.

improve the clarity of the assessment by separating historical performance from target setting and bringing in other performance-related areas such as renewable energy opportunities (CF 4). The *Policy* and *Finance* pillars would remain as they are with some adjustments and additions. This reorganisation would create a new structure that more clearly delineates the assessment results: recent performance informs the credibility of countries' ambitions, which are implemented through policies underpinned by financial flows that then deliver improved performance over time.

Ensuring comparability of results across years remains important. With this potential alternative structure, we would largely focus on relocating existing indicators, assigning them new pillar codes. We would also provide a mapping of new codes to previous codes to enable trend analysis.

**Figure 3.1. Overview of potential restructuring** *(current structure is shown on the left)*




**Consultation questions**

3.1. Which structure do you find more informative and helpful in terms of interpreting a country's climate performance? Please select the point on the scale provided in the online survey that is closest to your preference.

a. Existing three-pillar structure: Emissions Pathways, Climate Policies and Climate Finance
b. Potential new structure: Performance, Ambition, Policy, Finance

3.2. Please provide any further feedback on improvements to the framework structure.

## Introducing a new dimension: economy-wide versus sector-specific

Currently, sectoral transition planning is assessed in the sectoral transitions area (CP 4), which focuses on various sectoral targets and policies (see Box 3.1). We explore the potential introduction of a new layer to the framework that would differentiate between an economy-wide and sector-specific scope of the assessment. The sector-specific layer would reorganise indicators from existing areas and add two potential new areas to assess sector-specific emissions trends and investment plans (see Figure 3.2). The layer would draw on the existing methodology of the multi-sector decarbonisation strategy indicator (CP 4a), which evaluates climate efforts in five high-emitting sectors.

Appendix 4 provides a sample of potential indicators that would split indicator CP 4a into 10 distinct indicators to offer investors greater sectoral detail on national transition planning efforts. Appendix 5 presents a sample assessment for sectoral emissions trends, demonstrating how sectoral composition could inform users about the country's performance.

**Box 3.1. How we assess sectoral transitions in the current ASCOR framework (v. 1.2)**

CP 4.a: We assess if a country has a **multi-sector climate strategy** that sets quantified, sector-specific emissions targets and includes at least one related policy, initiative or regulation for five sectors: electricity; transport; industry; land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF); and a fifth significant sector.

CP 4.b: We assess if a country has a **law on energy efficiency** and an **energy efficiency target.**

CP 4.c: We assess if a country has established **mandatory climate-related disclosure**.

CP 4.d: We assess if a country has a **net zero electricity sector target** aligned with 1.5°C. This is based on the International Energy Agency's Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario (IEA, 2023), where the electricity sector reaches net zero by 2035 in advanced economies, 2040 in China and 2045 in the rest of the world.

CP 4.e: We assess if a country has **increased its protected areas as a percentage of total land area** over the previous five years.

Sectoral transition planning is emerging as a new frontier of climate policy. We already collect sector-specific information as part of the assessments, but these are currently not visible on the tool. This new structure would enable us to make these data available and interpretable for investors.

However, this restructuring presents several methodological challenges. A major challenge when assessing sectoral transition planning is the inconsistency of sector definitions and categories across data sources and countries. For example, some emissions data sources[17] only report 'energy' emissions as an aggregated sector; others disaggregate emissions into sub-sectors that may not necessarily match economic planning;[18] and others re-aggregate emissions into more commonly used economic sector categories.[19]

While country planning tends to be developed by economic sector, such as electricity or transport, these definitions and boundaries vary significantly. Some countries have broad roadmaps for the industrial sector whereas others have more detailed plans for cement or steel, for example. When evaluating and interpreting sectoral transition planning, it is important to consider how categorisations may differ across data sources and national documents. Despite these comparability challenges, it is useful to consider the sectoral emissions and economic profile of a country to understand both if its sector plans are properly addressing key emitters and where transition risk lies.

Adding a sector-specific scope could raise new challenges. For example, sectoral planning could lead to policy fragmentation in the absence of strong coordination and monitoring mechanisms. In some countries, limited institutional capacity may lead to trade-offs with cross-cutting enablers such as fiscal reform. In addition, defining sectoral investment plans, identifying potential sources for such plans and building clear criteria to assess them will be challenging. Although some guidance and practices have started to emerge, a consistent methodology would require specific criteria on the scope, methods and framing that can be applied across differing country contexts.

[17] The PRIMAP hist dataset (Gütschow et al., 2025) contains data at the highest emissions category aggregation, which categorises all fuel combustion activities (be they from electricity production or transport or any other source), into a single category.
[18] The EDGAR GHG emissions dataset (Crippa et al., 2025) contains data at the IPCC 2006 sub-sector level (excluding electricity and heat, road transport and certain other sectors).
[19] The Climate Trace dataset provides a detailed reaggregation of point source emissions within a given country based on machine learning algorithms at the detailed sector and subsector level. However, the dataset reports national totals that differ significantly from national emissions inventories under the UNFCCC frameworks due to the different methodologies.

**Figure 3.2. Overview of the current and potential new ASCOR frameworks** *(current structure is shown at the top)*



**Consultation questions**

3.3. How sufficiently detailed do you view the current assessment of sectoral policy (within area CP4)? Please select the point on the scale provided in the online survey that is closest to your view.

a. A sufficient level of analysis of sectoral transition planning
b. An insufficient level of analysis of sectoral transition planning and needs to be enhanced

3.4. Considering potential structural changes, please select the point on the scale provided in the online survey that is closest to your preference. ASCOR should have a:

a. Dynamic framework updated regularly to reflect market and policy developments
b. Stable framework that prioritises the comparability of assessment results over time

3.5. Recognising the trade-off between depth and breadth (i.e. in-depth sectoral assessments vs. the number of countries assessed), please select the point on the scale provided in the online survey that is closest to your preference.

a. In-depth assessment of sectoral transition planning and the materiality of specific policies to the achievement of NDCs applied to a very small number of countries (e.g. G7)
b. High-level assessment (current CP 4a indicator) applied to all countries in the ASCOR universe

3.6. Considering that we already assess if a country has disclosed (a) the costs of implementing its NDC and NAP (area CF 2) and (b) the budgetary expenditures allocated to climate-related measures (area CF 3), what further criteria would you expect a robust sectoral investment plan to meet?

3.7. For both emissions measurement and sectoral transition planning, what degree of sectoral disaggregation would be most useful? Please select the point on the scale provided in the online survey that is closest to your preference.

a. Broader aggregated categories (e.g. industrial sector as a whole)
b. More detailed sectoral breakdowns (e.g. individual industrial sectors such as steel and cement)

3.8. Recognising the consistency challenge across sector definitions, please select your preferred approach:

a. Prioritising comparability by adopting external sectoral definitions, e.g. IPCC categories or OECD DAC categories (which could mean we cannot assess countries with unique sectoral emissions profiles)
b. Prioritising comparability by defining a set of sectoral categories similar to the five-sector structure in indicator CP 4a
c. Prioritising flexibility on sectoral categories to reflect different country characteristics

3.9. Considering adaptation policy, please select the point on the scale provided in the online survey closest to your preference.

a. Indicators should be assessed at the economy-wide level (as they already are)
b. Indicators should be embedded in sector-specific assessments

3.10. Considering just transition policy, please select the point on the scale provided in the online survey closest to your preference.

a. Indicators should be assessed at the economy-wide level (as they already are)
b. Indicators should be embedded in sector-specific assessments

3.11. If you think adaptation and/or just transition should be embedded within sector-specific assessments, how should this be done?

# 4. How to respond and next steps

We are inviting feedback on this consultation by 31 January 2026 which can be submitted via this survey link. We welcome the views of investors, governments, development finance institutions, civil society, academia and the wider public to ensure that the ASCOR tool can continue to support the objectives of both investors and governments while aligning with recent literature and existing country practice.

The second version of the ASCOR framework will be informed by the survey results, drawing on the insights and priorities identified and incorporating elements that are relevant and feasible to implement. Depending on the consultation responses and follow-up research, the new framework may include further changes that are not covered in this document. Some new indicators may be tested only in beta form on a subset of countries.

A summary of the survey results will be published in a progress note in Q3 2026, ahead of the publication of the final methodology and country assessment results in Q4 2026. (Our full timeline is shown in Figure 4.1.)

**Figure 4.1. Timeline for the next steps**



# Appendix 1. Potential methodological changes by area

**This Appendix outlines identified methodological challenges and potential changes to the framework. This is a collection of the gaps we have identified during our assessments, through country and investor feedback and literature reviews. All areas, indicators and metrics mentioned in this Appendix refer to the current structure of the framework. Therefore, the content should be considered irrespective of the potential changes in the structure of the framework presented in Section 3.**

In considering potential changes and additional indicators or metrics, their inclusion must be balanced against the need to keep the framework practical and not overly complex or burdensome to assess. Accordingly, the potential changes outlined in this Appendix are not necessarily proposed revisions for ASCOR v. 2.0, but rather a comprehensive set of ideas intended to identify which issues stakeholders view as priorities and what solutions they see as most appropriate. Some of the challenges identified may not yet have a clear or tested solution, and in some cases further research or piloting will be required.

We summarise our current approach below and through the survey seek feedback on what can be improved in each area of the framework. Some areas also have specific questions in their sub-sections below. The areas on net zero targets (EP 4), climate legislation (CP 1) and carbon pricing (CP 2) do not have any identified changes and are therefore not included in the sub-sections below. In the survey we ask that respondents answer the relevant questions for each area for which they would like to share feedback.

**Consultation questions asked for each area of the ASCOR framework**

A1.1. Reflecting on the challenges described in Appendix 1 of the *ASCOR framework v. 2.0 consultation report*, please rank what priority you believe these challenges have for improving the ASCOR framework? *Answers provided on a five-point scale from 'High priority' to 'Not a priority' for listed challenges.*

A1.2. Reflecting on the challenges described in Appendix 1 of the *ASCOR framework v. 2.0 consultation report*, to what extent do you agree with the potential solution listed to address these challenges? *Answers provided on a five-point scale from 'Strongly agree' to 'Strongly disagree'.*

A1.3. What alternative solutions or data sources, if any, would you recommend to address these challenges?

## Pillar 1. Emissions Pathways

### EP 1. Emissions Trends, EP 2. 2030 targets and EP 3. 2035 targets

The indicators in these areas evaluate whether a country's recent emissions trends and medium-term (2030 and 2035) targets are consistent with cost-effective pathways compatible with limiting warming to 1.5°C. The purpose is to assess both performance and ambition against the goals of the Paris Agreement. We are exploring potential improvements in these areas, including integration of conditional targets and LULUCF emissions into target assessments. We are also exploring how the ASCOR emissions data can support disclosure in line with the Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials (PCAF).

**Table A.1.1. Identified challenges and potential solutions**

| Indicator | Original purpose | Challenges identified | Potential solution |
|---|---|---|---|
| *EP 1b. Is the most recent 5-year trend aligned with meeting the country's 1.5°C benchmark?* | These indicators assess if a country's trends and targets are aligned with a country-specific 1.5°C cost-effective pathway from the | The stretch goal of the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 1.5°C has become effectively infeasible without overshoot, making these benchmarks increasingly | **Include a new 'below 2°C' benchmark alongside the 1.5°C benchmark for each country. These benchmarks could potentially be sourced from the NGFS or Gütschow et al. (2021).**<br>Pros: This would provide greater differentiation among countries by |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *EP 2c. Is the country's 2030 target aligned with its 1.5°C benchmark?*<br>*EP 3c. Is the country's 2035 target aligned with its 1.5°C benchmark?* | 1.5°C National Pathway Explorer. The associated metrics assess the country's degree of alignment with the benchmark. | difficult (although not impossible) for countries to align with. Few countries have emissions trends or 2030/2035 targets aligned with a cost-effective 1.5°C pathway, resulting in limited differentiation across countries. | identifying those whose targets fall short of 1.5°C alignment but would still represent meaningful ambition. This would also mirror the approach used in the TPI Centre's Carbon Performance framework.<br>Cons: The temperature threshold underlying the 'Below 2°C' scenarios is ambiguous and may vary between possible sources. Country and GHG coverage and downscaling methodology may vary between the possible sources of 'Below 2°C' and the 1.5°C benchmarks. There is a concern over loosening the focus on 1.5°C, given that 1.5°C pathways remain technically feasible, albeit with overshoot. |

Note: Any changes to the cost-efficient benchmarks would be mirrored with the fair share benchmarks (EP 1c, EP 2d and EP 3d).

## Pillar 2. Climate Policies

### CP 3. Fossil fuels

This area assesses commitments to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and new fossil fuel projects. It tests whether a country's policies on and financing of fossil fuels align with the Paris Agreement (Article 2.1.c).

**Table A1.2. Identified challenges and potential solutions**

| Indicator | Original purpose | Challenges identified | Potential solution |
|---|---|---|---|
| *CP 3a. Has the country committed to a deadline by which to phase out fossil fuel subsidies?* | This indicator assesses if a country has set a deadline to phase out fossil fuel subsidies. | The lack of a common definition of fossil fuel subsidies (e.g. the WTO, OECD, IEA and IMF have different definitions) can lead to loopholes in phaseout plans and commitments. | **To improve clarity, we could introduce an additional criterion or indicator to assess whether the country defines which subsidies to phase out.**<br>Pros: Some countries are developing such definitions, including Canada, Germany and Italy, and it could be useful to showcase this effort.<br>Cons: Countries already perform weakly on this area and rarely define the subsidies they intend to phase out. |
| *CP 3d. Has the country committed not to approve new long-lead-time upstream oil and gas projects?* | This indicator assesses if a country has committed to phase out new oil and gas exploration and production. According to the IEA,[20] there is no need for new long lead-time upstream | We only assess high-income countries as this is a high-ambition indicator. However, continued investment in such projects could create stranded assets, and, for developing countries, represent a worse development pathway that misses the | **We are revisiting this exemption to explore whether middle-income countries should be assessed on CP 3d.**<br>Pros: Where a middle-income country implements such a ban, there is a benefit from showcasing leadership (e.g. Costa Rica and Colombia).<br>Cons: The indicator requires an ambitious commitment which is already rare among high-income |

[20] See IEA (2023): p. 16 Net Zero Roadmap: A Global Pathway to Keep the 1.5°C Goal in Reach - 2023 Update and IEA (2024): p.239 World Energy Outlook 2024.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | oil and gas projects in a 1.5°C scenario. | opportunity of leapfrogging to low-carbon energy sources. | countries (only 6 of 63 applicable countries currently achieve 'Yes'). |

### CP 5. Adaptation

This area assesses the management of physical climate risks through an evaluation of the national adaptation planning cycle, which includes National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), risk assessments and monitoring and evaluation reports. It also assesses disaster risk management. We follow the adaptation indicators agreed in November 2025 at COP30 as part of the Global Goal on Adaptation for potential improvements in this area.

**Table A1.3. Identified challenges and potential solutions**

| Indicator | Original purpose | Challenges identified | Potential solution |
|---|---|---|---|
| *CP 5a. Has the country published a NAP?*<br><br>*CP 5b. Does the country regularly publish a national climate risk assessment?* | These indicators assess if a country has a NAP with detailed policies and measures that reduce vulnerability to risks identified through national assessments. | We do not currently assess the connection between national adaptation planning and risk assessments. | **We are exploring what potential elements can be integrated to assess adaptation implementation. A new indicator could assess whether the country's NAP addresses material risks identified in its national risk assessment.**<br><br>Pros: This would specify whether the adaptation measures listed in the NAP are grounded in recent risk assessments.<br><br>Cons: Completing this assessment may require labour-intensive policy analysis. |
| *CP 5e. Is the country part of a sovereign catastrophe risk pool?* | This indicator assesses participation in risk pools which can support recovery after disasters. | A limited number of assessed countries (9 of 36) are part of a catastrophe risk pool. We also currently do not assess other mechanisms to reduce the exposure of public finances to disaster risk. | **We could include other instruments equivalent to a catastrophe risk pool, and/or a new indicator on financial resilience to disasters. We welcome feedback on other potential variables and indicators that may enable financial and management preparedness for adaptation.**<br><br>Pros: This would capture other disaster risk response measures when evaluating a country's vulnerability to climate risks.<br><br>Cons: Finding a common list of instruments that can be accepted across income groups would be challenging. Focusing on public tools could under-emphasise the role of private insurance. |

### CP 6. Just transition

This area assesses if a country has legal and regulatory frameworks to address social risks and opportunities arising from the low-carbon transition. We evaluate the legal recognition of fundamental rights, inclusive just transition approaches, green jobs strategies and the integration of just transition into carbon pricing.

Table A1.4. Identified challenges and potential solutions

| Indicator | Original purpose | Challenges identified | Potential solution |
|---|---|---|---|
| *CP 6a. Has the country ratified fundamental human, labour and Indigenous rights conventions?* | We assess the ratification of various international conventions including the Indigenous rights convention (UNDRIP and ILO Convention No. 169), which only applies to countries with Indigenous populations. | Our criteria of requiring countries to ratify at least half of the selected international conventions does not provide detail on how many have been ratified. | **Transform the indicator into a metric stating the share of ratified conventions rather than a Yes/No result.**<br>Pros: This would inform investors on the number of ratified conventions. It would also correct the bias of assessing a country as 'Yes' if they have only met the minimum threshold.<br>Cons: Transforming the indicator to a metric would limit comparability with past assessments. |
| | | The criterion for countries with Indigenous populations to ratify ILO No. 169 blocks many countries from achieving this indicator even though they meet all other criteria on fundamental human and labour rights conventions. | **Split the indicator into two and assess the endorsement of UNDRIP and the ratification of the ILO Convention No. 169 in a separate indicator.**<br>Pros: This would allow more countries to meet the human and labour rights indicator. It would also improve comparability of the indicator between countries with Indigenous populations and those without.<br>Cons: Doing so would limit comparability with past assessments. |
| *CP 6c. Does the country have a green jobs strategy?* | This indicator assesses whether a country has a green jobs strategy that identifies the employment-related opportunities from the transition and sets actions, measures or policies to harness these identified opportunities. | The indicator captures high-level policy strategies without necessarily assessing the implementation of stated policies. | **Include a new indicator or criterion to assess the implementation of green jobs strategies, for example if they include quantitative analysis or concrete measures (e.g. social safety nets). A new indicator could assess how countries are incorporating just transition in fossil fuel phaseouts and other sectors.**<br>Pros: This can inform investors on the state of implementation and assess the credibility of green jobs strategies.<br>Cons: The state of green jobs strategies are largely high-level documents, with few countries undertaking in-depth analysis. This potential new indicator may be labour-intensive and potentially too ambitious, especially for emerging market economies. |

## Pillar 3. Climate Finance

### CF 1. International climate finance

This area assesses whether a country has contributed or committed to contribute a proportional share of the international climate finance goal. For targets beyond 2025, which is when the $100 billion per year goal expires, we take into account the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) agreed at COP29 in 2024

of $300 billion per year by 2035.[21] Currently, we assess only Annex II countries,[22] a subset of developed economies defined in 1992, which together made the original $100 billion international climate finance commitment at COP15 in 2009.

Table A1.5. Identified challenges and potential solutions

| Indicator | Original purpose | Challenges identified | Potential solution |
|---|---|---|---|
| *CF 1a. Does the country contribute at least a proportional share of the international climate finance commitment?*<br><br>*CF 1b. Does the country's targeted climate finance contribution represent at least a proportional share of the international commitment?* | Assessing whether countries individually contribute a proportional share of this goal based on their respective GDP levels can help hold high-income countries accountable to this goal. | Annex I countries that are not part of Annex II, which include a larger group of developed countries, are not currently assessed. We received feedback from some country governments to remove the exemption of certain developed countries in this area to spotlight those that provide voluntary contributions. The NCQG decision uses the terms 'developed' and 'developing' countries without providing a list of countries included in each group. | **Expand the list of countries assessed beyond Annex II countries.**<br><br>Pros: This would inform investors about other countries' international climate finance contributions. If we use the OECD list (Annex II countries, all EU countries, Lichtenstein and Monaco),[23] we can increase our coverage to all European countries. This would mean assessing 12 European countries that are not currently assessed.<br><br>Cons: The non-Annex II countries were not part of the original $100 billion commitment and there is no officially agreed list of countries that should contribute to the NCQG. Data on future commitments from new countries may also be limited. |

## CF 2. Transparency in climate costing

This area assesses whether a country has disclosed the costs of the measures identified in its NDC and NAP, providing a breakdown by sector, policy or measure. We only assess non-Annex I countries (mostly developing economies), consistent with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement,[24] which guide developing countries to report on the financial support they require. Developed countries are exempt from these indicators because the Paris Agreement does not require them to disclose their finance needs.

Table A1.6. Identified challenges and potential solutions

| Indicator | Original purpose | Challenges identified | Potential solutions |
|---|---|---|---|
| *CF 2a. Has the country disclosed a transparent breakdown of the costs of implementing its Nationally Determined Contribution?* | Costing the actions identified in NDCs and NAPs can help mobilise different means of implementation, such as finance, capacity-building and technological support, in line with | We received feedback from investors have told us that assessing the disclosure of investment needs by developed countries would inform the credibility of their NDCs. Our preliminary research on a sample of developed countries | **Remove the exemption to assess developed countries on both indicators using the existing methodology.**<br><br>Pros: Improve the evaluation of NDCs and NAPs to capture information on financial plans in developed countries.<br><br>Cons: The indicator requires disclosure of absolute estimates of investment needs, but such disclosures are rare |

[21] For details of our estimate of proportional share, see ASCOR framework: methodology note v. 1.2.
[22] Countries have different commitments depending on which groups they are in according to the UNFCCC. Annex II countries are required to provide financial support to developing countries to support their mitigation and adaptation efforts.
[23] OECD (2024) Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2022, Climate Finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal.
[24] UNFCCC (2018) Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, Decision 18/CMA.1, para. 132.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *CF 2b. Has the country disclosed a transparent breakdown of the costs of implementing its National Adaptation Plan?* | country-specific needs. | revealed that their disclosures rarely provide a comprehensive cost breakdown (which we assess for developing countries) but rather focus on tools such as scenario modelling, marginal abatement cost curves (MACC) or sector-specific cost and price analyses. | among developed countries. Elements of investment plans may be embedded in the broader national strategies of developed countries.[25] Given that developed countries' disclosures vary widely compared with developing countries in terms of their methods and sources of disclosure, these would be burdensome to assess.<br>**Add a new indicator focused on sectoral investment plans.**<br>Pros: Same as above.<br>Cons: Establishing a consistent definition of sectoral investment plans would require further research. See Section 3 for further discussion. |

### CF 3. Transparency in climate spending

This area currently assesses if a country has disclosed expenditures towards climate action and applies a budget tagging methodology.

**Table A1.7. Identified challenges and potential solutions**

| Indicator | Original purpose | Challenges identified | Potential solution |
|---|---|---|---|
| *CF 3a. Has the country disclosed its climate-related expenditure?*<br>*CF 3b. Does the country apply climate budget tagging?* | These indicators assess if a country is transparent about the amount of public funds allocated towards implementing climate commitments. | We do not assess a quantitative metric on *how much* governments are allocating to climate spending because disclosure, definitions and methods on budgetary climate spending vary widely across countries. | **Add an indicator or metric to assess subsidy programmes and quantify expenditures allocated to climate goals.**<br>Pros: This can inform investors on the scale of fiscal support for climate action.<br>Cons: Consistency challenges remain. The IEA Government Energy Spending Tracker can be a potential source, but it has limited country coverage. |
| | | The current assessment does not provide further insights into other elements of public finance such as revenue streams. | **Add an indicator on revenue-generating fiscal tools to finance mitigation and adaptation measures.**<br>Pros: Earmarking revenue for climate action can enable governments to demonstrate a credible investment narrative.[26] Assessing if a country has established revenue streams for its climate funding needs, such as earmarked taxes, funds or green bonds, offers insight into NDC credibility. We welcome any comments on the potential advantages or disadvantages of considering budgetary or non- |

[25] OECD/UNDP (2025) Investing in Climate for Growth and Development: The Case for Enhanced NDCs.
[26] Ibid..

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | budgetary revenues earmarked for climate spending.<br>Cons: Relevant regulations may vary across countries. Earmarking also creates constraints that can limit public finance decisions. |

### CF 4. Renewable energy opportunities

This area assesses the pipeline of new renewable energy capacity, defined as the capacity in megawatts (MW) of projects that have either been announced, are in pre-construction or are under construction. This pipeline of new renewable energy capacity is normalised by the country's existing fossil fuel-based electricity capacity, showcasing where renewables are overtaking fossil fuels in power generation.

**Table A1.8. Identified challenges and potential solutions**

| Metrics | Original purpose | Challenges identified | Potential solution |
|---|---|---|---|
| *CF 4i. What is the country's solar energy pipeline compared with its fossil energy capacity?*<br>*CF 4ii. As above but for wind energy.*<br>*CF 4iii. As above but for geothermal energy.*<br>*CF 4iv. As above but for hydroelectric energy.* | These metrics assess the renewable energy pipeline to identify where renewable energy expansion is being actively pursued as a proxy for potential transition investment opportunities. | This is the only area of the framework that does not have any binary Yes/No indicators, making it difficult to interpret countries' performance at the area-level. | **Add an indicator on whether the country is on track to triple its renewable energy capacity by 2030, as part of the global goal agreed at COP28. We would assess progress against a pathway interpolated between a country's renewable energy capacity in 2023 and a 2030 target.**<br>Pros: This would drive accountability by drawing on a global goal to evaluate the progress of individual countries.<br>Cons: Tripling renewable capacity is a global goal, but the pace of domestic renewable expansion will depend on country context. This indicator would implicitly assume that all countries should scale up renewable capacity at similar rates. |

# Appendix 2. ASCOR framework v. 1.2

| Pillar 1 | Emissions Pathways (EP) | Answer type[27] | Countries assessed[28] |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP 1 | Emissions trends | | |
| EP 1.a | Has the country improved its emissions profile over the past 5 years? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 1.a.i | What is the country's most recent emissions level? | $MtCO_2e$ | All |
| EP 1.a.ii | What is the country's most recent emissions trend? | % | All |
| EP 1.b | Is the most recent 5-year trend aligned with meeting the country's 1.5°C benchmark? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 1.b.i | How far is the most recent emissions trend from meeting the country's 1.5°C benchmark? | % | All |
| EP 1.c | Is the most recent 5-year trend aligned with meeting the country's 1.5°C fair share? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 1.c.i | How far is the most recent emissions trend from meeting the country's 1.5°C fair share? | % | All |
| EP 2 | 2030 targets | | |
| EP 2.a | Has the country set a 2030 emission reduction target? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 2.a.i | What is the targeted reduction relative to 2019 emissions? | % | All |
| EP 2.b | Does the country specify whether and how much carbon credits may contribute to its 2030 target? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 2.b.i | What percentage of the 2030 target will be met using carbon credits? | % | All |
| EP 2.c | Is the country's 2030 target aligned with its 1.5°C benchmark? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 2.c.i | What is the degree of alignment with its 1.5°C benchmark? | % | All |
| EP 2.d | Is the country's 2030 target aligned with its 1.5°C fair share? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 2.d.i | What is the degree of alignment with its 1.5°C fair share? | % | All |
| EP 3 | 2035 targets | | |
| EP 3.a | Has the country set a 2035 emission reduction target? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 3.a.i | What is the targeted reduction relative to 2019 emissions? | % | All |
| EP 3.b | Does the country specify whether and how much carbon credits may contribute to its 2035 target? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 3.b.i | What percentage of the 2035 target will be met using carbon credits? | % | All |
| EP 3.c | Is the country's 2035 target aligned with its 1.5°C benchmark? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 3.c.i | What is the degree of alignment with its 1.5°C benchmark? | % | All |
| EP 3.d | Is the country's 2035 target aligned with its 1.5°C fair share? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 3.d.i | What is the degree of alignment with its 1.5°C fair share? | % | All |
| EP 4 | Net zero targets | | |
| EP 4.a | Has the country set a net zero $CO_2$ target? | Yes/No | All |
| EP 4.a.i | In what year is the net zero $CO_2$ target set? | Year | All |
| EP 4.b | Is the country's net zero $CO_2$ target aligned with a global 1.5°C scenario? | Yes/No | HI/MI |
| EP 4.c | Is the country's net zero $CO_2$ target aligned with an accelerated deadline for high-income countries? | Yes/No | HI |

[27] The darker shaded rows indicate a binary Yes/No response and the lighter shaded rows indicate a response with a quantitative metric.

[28] High-income (HI) countries are assessed on all applicable ASCOR indicators and metrics whereas middle-income (MI) and low-income (LI) countries are exempt on certain indicators and metrics. See the ASCOR Methodology Note for further details.

| Pillar 2 | Climate Policies (CP) | Answer type | Countries assessed |
|---|---|---|---|
| CP 1 | Climate legislation | | |
| CP 1.a | Does the country have a climate framework law or equivalent? | Yes/No | All |
| CP 1.b | Does the country's climate framework law specify key accountability elements? | Yes/No | All |
| CP 2 | Carbon pricing | | |
| CP 2.a | Does the country have a carbon pricing system? | Yes/No | HI, MI |
| CP 2.b | Does the country's carbon pricing system cover at least 50% of national greenhouse gas emissions? | Yes/No | HI, MI |
| CP 2.b.i | What percentage of national greenhouse gas emissions is covered by an explicit carbon price? | % | HI, MI |
| CP 2.c | Does the country's carbon pricing system align with the Paris Agreement? | Yes/No | HI |
| CP 2.c.i | What is the country's most recent explicit carbon price? | US$/ $tCO_2e$ | HI |
| CP 3 | Fossil fuels | | |
| CP 3.a | Has the country committed to a deadline by which to phase out fossil fuel subsidies? | Yes/No | HI, MI |
| CP 3.a.i | By what year has the country committed to phase out fossil fuel subsidies? | Year | HI, MI |
| CP 3.b | Does the country publish an inventory of direct fossil fuel subsidies? | Yes/No | HI |
| CP 3.b.i | How much is spent annually on explicit fossil fuel subsidies as a percentage of GDP? | % | HI, MI |
| CP 3.c | Has the country committed not to approve new coal mines? | Yes/No | HI, MI |
| CP 3.c.i | What is the level of coal rents in the country as a percentage of GDP? | % | HI, MI |
| CP 3.d | Has the country committed not to approve new long-lead-time upstream oil and gas projects? | Yes/No | HI |
| CP 3.d.i | What is the level of oil rents in the country as a percentage of GDP? | % | HI, MI |
| CP 3.d.ii | What is the level of natural gas rents in the country as a percentage of GDP? | % | HI, MI |
| CP 4 | Sectoral transitions | | |
| CP 4.a | Does the country have a multi-sector climate strategy? | Yes/No | HI, MI |
| CP 4.b | Does the country have a law and target on energy efficiency? | Yes/No | HI, MI |
| CP 4.b.i | What is the country's energy intensity of primary energy? | MJ/US$ | HI, MI |
| CP 4.c | Has the country established mandatory climate-related disclosure? | Yes/No | HI |
| CP 4.d | Has the country set a net zero electricity target aligned with 1.5°C? | Yes/No | HI, MI |
| CP 4.d.i | What percentage of the country's electricity generation is from low-carbon sources? | % | HI, MI |
| CP 4.e | Has the country increased its protected areas as a % of total land area over the last 5 years? | Yes/No | HI, MI |
| CP 4.e.i | What is the amount of protected area in the country as a % of total land area? | % | HI, MI |
| CP 5 | Adaptation | | |
| CP 5.a | Has the country published a National Adaptation Plan? | Yes/No | All |
| CP 5.b | Does the country regularly publish national climate risk assessments? | Yes/No | All |
| CP 5.c | Has the country published a Monitoring and Evaluation report on implementing adaptation? | Yes/No | All |
| CP 5.d | Does the country have a multi-hazard early warning system? | Yes/No | All |
| CP 5.e | Is the country part of a sovereign catastrophe risk pool? | Yes/No | MI, LI |
| CP 6 | Just transition | | |
| CP 6.a | Has the country ratified fundamental human, labour and Indigenous rights conventions? | Yes/No | All |
| CP 6.a.i | At what percentile is the country's Voice and Accountability estimate? | % | All |
| CP 6.b | Does the country have an inclusive and institutionalised approach on just transition? | Yes/No | All |
| CP 6.c | Does the country have a green jobs strategy? | Yes/No | All |
| CP 6.d | Does the country integrate just transition into its carbon pricing? | Yes/No | HI, MI |

| Pillar 3 | Climate Finance (CF) | Answer type | Countries assessed |
|---|---|---|---|
| CF 1 | International climate finance | | |
| CF 1.a | Does the country contribute at least a proportional share of the international climate finance commitment? | Yes/No | Annex II |
| CF 1.a.i | What is the country's 3-year average climate finance contribution as a % of GDP? | % | Annex II |
| CF 1.b | Does the country's targeted climate finance contribution represent at least a proportional share of the international climate finance commitment? | Yes/No | Annex II |
| CF 1.b.i | What is the country's targeted level of international climate finance contributions as a % of GDP? | % | Annex II |
| CF 2 | Transparency in climate costing | | |
| CF 2.a | Has the country disclosed a transparent breakdown of the costs of implementing its NDC? | Yes/No | Non-Annex I |
| CF 2.b | Has the country disclosed a transparent breakdown of the costs of implementing its National Adaptation Plan? | Yes/No | Non-Annex I |
| CF 3 | Transparency in climate spending | | |
| CF 3.a | Has the country disclosed its climate-related expenditure? | Yes/No | All |
| CF 3.b | Does the country apply climate budget tagging? | Yes/No | All |
| CF 4 | Renewable energy opportunities | | |
| CF 4.i | What is the country's solar energy pipeline compared with its fossil energy capacity? | Ratio | All |
| CF 4.ii | What is the country's wind energy pipeline compared with its fossil energy capacity? | | All |
| CF 4.iii | What is the country's geothermal energy pipeline compared with its fossil energy capacity? | | All |
| CF 4.iv | What is the country's hydroelectric energy pipeline compared with its fossil energy capacity? | | All |

# Appendix 3. 2025 pillar scores results

| Income group | Quartile | Emissions Pathways | | | Climate Policies and Finance | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | First | Austria | Germany | Slovenia | Austria | France | Norway |
| | | Barbados | Norway | Sweden | Canada | Germany | Rep of Korea |
| | | Chile | Panama | Switzerland | Chile | Ireland | Spain |
| | | Denmark | Portugal | UK | Denmark | Netherlands | Sweden |
| | | Finland | | | Finland | | |
| | Second | Bulgaria | Ireland | Luxembourg | Australia | Latvia | Slovenia |
| | | Cyprus | Japan | Netherlands | Bulgaria | Lithuania | Switzerland |
| | | Estonia | Latvia | New Zealand | Greece | Luxembourg | UK |
| | | Hungary | Lithuania | Slovak Rep | Japan | Portugal | Uruguay |
| | Third | Australia | Hong Kong | Romania | Belgium | Hungary | New Zealand |
| | | Belgium | Italy | Singapore | Croatia | Isreal | Panama |
| | | Croatia | Isreal | Spain | Cyprus | Italy | Romania |
| | | France | Malta | Uruguay | Czechia | Malta | Slovak Rep |
| | | Greece | | | Estonia | | |
| | Fourth | Bahrain | Oman | Russia | Bahrain | Oman | Saudi Arabia |
| | | Canada | Poland | Saudi Arabia | Barbados | Poland | Singapore |
| | | Czechia | Qatar | UAE | Hong Kong | Qatar | UAE |
| | | Kuwait | Rep of Korea | United States | Kuwait | Russia | United States |
| Middle | Quartile | Emissions Pathways | | | Climate Policies and Finance | | |
| | First | Brazil | Costa Rica | Peru | Argentina | Ecuador | Serbia |
| | | Colombia | Jamaica | Ukraine | Colombia | Mexico | South Africa |
| | Second | Argentina | Malaysia | Thailand | Brazil | Costa Rica | Peru |
| | | Dominican Rep | South Africa | | China | Indonesia | |
| | Third | Ecuador | Paraguay | Türkiye | Dominican Rep | Paraguay | Ukraine |
| | | Kazakhstan | Serbia | | Kazakhstan | Türkiye | |
| | Fourth | Azerbaijan | El Salvador | Mexico | Azerbaijan | Jamaica | Thailand |
| | | China | Indonesia | | El Salvador | Malaysia | |
| Low | Quartile | Emissions Pathways | | | Climate Policies and Finance | | |
| | First | Ghana | Sri Lanka | Uganda | Bangladesh | Kenya | Philippines |
| | | Nigeria | | | Jordan | | |
| | Second | India | Morocco | Vietnam | Nigeria | Sri Lanka | Uganda |
| | Third | Angola | Bangladesh | Jordan | Angola | Morocco | Pakistan |
| | | Kenya | | | Ghana | | |
| | Fourth | Egypt | Pakistan | Philippines | Egypt | India | Vietnam |

Note: ASCOR pillar scores are presented by quartile of relative performance in each income group. Results in each quartile are presented by alphabetical order rather than rank.

# Appendix 4. Sample indicators to assess new sectoral transition areas

The tables below illustrate how we could split the current indicator CP 4a within the potential new ASCOR structure by separating sectoral targets from sectoral policies. This restructure would provide more detailed data at the sector level. A similar set of indicators may be designed for potential new areas: sectoral emissions trends and sectoral investment plans. As explained in Section 3, sectoral categories may be inconsistent across countries and across areas in one country assessment under the potential new structure.

| Pillar | Ambition | Answer type |
|---|---|---|
| Focus | Sector-specific | |
| Area | Sectoral targets | |
| Indicator 1 | Does the country have a decarbonisation target for the electricity sector? | Yes/No |
| Indicator 2 | Does the country have a decarbonisation target for the transport sector? | Yes/No |
| Indicator 3 | Does the country have a decarbonisation target for the industry sector? | Yes/No |
| Indicator 4 | Does the country have a decarbonisation target for the agriculture or forestry sector? | Yes/No |
| Indicator 5 | Does the country have a decarbonisation target for a fifth significant sector? | Yes/No |

| Pillar | Policies | Answer type |
|---|---|---|
| Focus | Sector-specific | |
| Area | Sectoral policies | |
| Indicator 1 | Does the country have a decarbonisation plan for the electricity sector? | Yes/No |
| Indicator 2 | Does the country have a decarbonisation plan for the transport sector? | Yes/No |
| Indicator 3 | Does the country have a decarbonisation plan for the industry sector? | Yes/No |
| Indicator 4 | Does the country have a decarbonisation plan for the agriculture or forestry sector? | Yes/No |
| Indicator 5 | Does the country have a decarbonisation plan for a fifth significant sector? | Yes/No |

# Appendix 5. Sample assessment: Germany's sectoral emissions trends

Carrying out this additional sectoral profiling for Germany shows that while the power sector is the biggest emissions source, it is also the sector that is cutting emissions the fastest. Emissions in buildings, transport and agriculture are also declining, but at a slower pace.

Table A5.1. Germany's sectoral emissions trends, 2018–24

| Sector | Total change (%) 2018–2024 | Average annual change (%/year) 2018–2024 | Proportion 2024 (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Power | -42.02% | -6.86% | 23.86% |
| Manufacturing | -9.97% | -1.79% | 20.77% |
| Transportation | -4.42% | -0.65% | 19.27% |
| Buildings | -2.76% | -0.70% | 16.66% |
| Agriculture | -7.04% | -1.28% | 9.82% |
| Fossil Fuel Operations | -17.85% | -3.38% | 5.53% |
| Waste | -7.15% | -1.35% | 2.56% |
| Fluorinated Gases | -31.19% | -6.53% | 1.47% |
| Mineral Extraction | -40.75% | -9.54% | 0.05% |
| Total | -19.23% | -2.99% | 100.00% |

Figure A5.1. Germany's emissions profile by sector, 2018–24




Including information on sectoral composition on the ASCOR tool in this way would highlight differences within and between countries, offering insights into which sectors drive overall emissions, and which ones may require stronger policies to accelerate progress.

# Disclaimer

Assessing Sovereign Climate-related Opportunities and Risks (hereinafter referred to as "ASCOR") is an investor-led project to develop a publicly available, independent tool that assesses countries on climate change. The TPI Global Climate Transition Centre ("TPI Centre") at the London School of Economics and Political Science ("LSE") is the ASCOR academic expert.

The ASCOR framework is for illustrative non-commercial research and educational purposes. The ASCOR or any related material hosted on the TPI Centre website does not constitute any advice (including investment, legal, accounting or tax advice) or an investment instrument. The TPI Centre and ASCOR supporting partners are not responsible for the content of the website and information resources that may be referenced herein, including any third-party sources. The access provided to these sites and the provision of such resources do not constitute an endorsement by LSE, the TPI Centre, ASCOR or its partners of the information contained therein and of the resulting sovereign assessments. Unauthorised use of the materials published herein is strictly prohibited. LSE, the TPI Centre and ASCOR do not accept any responsibility for any prohibited, restricted or unauthorised use of the materials published herein. All liability in this respect is excluded. Additionally, ASCOR, the TPI Centre, LSE and its partners are not responsible for any errors or omissions, for any decision made or action taken based on information on the website or for any loss or damage arising from or caused by such decision or action. All information is provided "as-is" with no guarantee of completeness, accuracy or timeliness, or of the results obtained from the use of this information, and without warranty of any kind, expressed or implied.

ASCOR and its partners do not require or seek collective decision-making or action with respect to acquiring, holding and/or selling sovereign debt instruments. Any such decision shall be at the sole investor's discretion and made in their individual organisation's capacities. This means that users of the information provided by ASCOR are responsible for their own investment analysis and decisions and must always act completely independently to set their own strategies, policies and practices based on their own best interests and commercial interests.

Furthermore, the use of ASCOR information for engagement tools and tactics with sovereigns (whether bi-laterally or collaboratively) is at the discretion of individual investors. Even the exchange of information in the context of collaboration can give the appearance of a potentially unlawful agreement; it is important to avoid exchanging information which might result in, or appear to result in, a breach of corporate or competition law. Investors must avoid coordination of strategic behaviour between competitors that impacts or is likely to impact competition.

During such engagements, investors may not claim to represent ASCOR or its partners, including the TPI Centre that, in consultation with ASCOR investor partners, curated the development of the ASCOR framework and of the indicators to transparently assess the progress made by governments in managing the low-carbon transition and the impacts of climate change.

The ASCOR data and information may not be used in any way other than as permitted above. If you would like to use any such data or information in a manner that is not permitted above, including for commercial purposes, you will need the TPI Centre's written permission. In this regard, please email all inquiries to tpi.centre.ascor@lse.ac.uk.

## TPI Centre research team


TPI Global Climate Transition Centre
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, UK

T +44 (0)20 7107 5027
E tpi@lse.ac.uk

Transition Pathway Initiative
C/o UN-PRI Association
1st Floor, 20 Wood Street
London EC2V 7AF, UK

T +44 (0)20 3714 3141
E info@transitionpathwayinitiative.org
@tp_initiative

www.transitionpathwayinitiative.org